1. “Unemployed feel the cruelty of misdirected kindness,” The Australian, July 22, 1993, p. 11.
2. “White Paper destined to disappoint on jobs,” The Weekend Australian, April 30-May 1, 1994, p. 2.

1.
Padraic P. McGuinness, “Unemployed feel the cruelty of misdirected kindness,” The Australian, July 22, 1993, p. 11.

The problem of long-term unemployment is clearly one of the most serious economic and social problems facing Australia at the moment — so the Government a couple of months ago appointed a committee to look into it.

But, useful though this exercise will be, since it includes people like Dr Mike Keating, head of the Prime Minister’s Department, and Professor Bob Gregory of the Australian National University, both of them experts on labour market economics, it will, apart from its analysis of the Australian statistics relevant to the problem, add little that is new in terms of either explanations or solutions.

This is simply because the nature of the problem is far from unique to Australia. It exists in all the developed industrial economies of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, and that experience, and the analysis of the causes and possible remedies for the problem, is summarised in the latest annual Employment Outlook just published by the OECD.

The core of the problem is to be found in the failure of most governments to consider labour market economics and social policy together. If, for example, it is thought to be a good idea to entrench the tenure of those with jobs, this will have economic consequences which cannot be ignored. Paradoxically (though logically, when you think about it), the easier it is to sack people, the better their prospects are of regaining employment. If the cost of retrenchment is high — in terms of payments for length of service, severance bonuses, etc — then employers are going to be reluctant to hire people.

So the unintended consequence of making life more secure for those in employment is to make life, and future employment prospects, worse for those who do not have jobs. Moreover, those in employment are likely to use the costs of retrenchment as a device for raising wages for themselves, making the costs as well as the risks of hiring additional employees so high that employers will be extremely choosy about taking on any additional employees.

(The consciences of the privileged are salved by appealing to 19th-century notions of “workers’ solidarity” and condemning the victims of their selfishness who are prepared to accept less onerous conditions of work in opposition to their policies as “scabs”.)

Then there is the contradiction between social policies designed to cushion the impact of job loss and the necessary incentives to those who lose their jobs to look for work before their skills and morals have been undermined by being too long out of the workforce. (It is also true, whether just or not, that employers are suspicious of the employability of people who have been long out of work.)

There is a very clear correlation in all the OECD countries between the length of income support offered to those who lose their jobs and the size of the long-term unemployment (LTU) problem. That is, the longer people are able to stay on unemployment benefits, the greater their prospects of staying out of work for good. Thus while it seems humane and socially desirable to help people who lose their jobs, unless this help is limited in time and strictly administered it will act as a disincentive to active job-seeking while re-employment prospects are at their highest.

Those countries that have limited duration benefits have a smaller LTU problem, and the shorter the period of the benefits the less the problem. We do exactly the wrong thing. We treat benefits as a matter of right to those who lose their jobs, and get tougher on them over time.

It would probably be preferable to offer only minimal benefits in the short term, and more generous support as unemployment becomes chronic. (There are all too many who, especially if they receive redundancy payments as well as benefits, decide to have a holiday, only to find that by doing so they have rendered themselves virtually unemployable.)

It is also clear that lack of educational qualifications is directly related to the problem of LTU; this is not something that can be easily reversed, but it serves to emphasise, first, that we are doing our kids a favour by keeping them at school and, second, we would be doing them a much bigger favour if the schools could guarantee to make them literate and numerate. It is not for nothing that the unemployed young complain they have been duded by the education system over the past 20 years — they have been.

But it is too late for many of the long-term unemployed, who are suffering from their underprivileged status in the past, and who missed out on opportunities for post-school training.

What can be done for them that has some hope of producing reasonably quick and effective results? The first thing, of course, would be to break down all the barriers in the labour market as it exists, whether they go under the name of “hard-won conditions” or social policy. A social safety net should exist, but certainly in the initial stages of unemployment help would be better administered by the more hard-headed non-governmental welfare agencies, like the Salvation Army. And if we want to give hope to the unemployed (as well as encourage employers to foster long service and low labour turnover), we have to make people easier to sack, not harder.

For the present, the most hopeful approaches to dealing with LTU according to the OECD analysis are active labour market policies, and short-term contracts.

The first is again exactly the opposite of what has habitually been done in Australia. It means spending money not on “passive” income support for those who are out of work, but on measures to help them get jobs — placement and counselling of the unemployed, training, direct job creation and employment subsidies. We have made a start on all these, but the voluntary agencies are bitterly critical of the performance of the governmental agencies. “Job clubs”, whereby groups of long-term unemployed get together with voluntary advisers for mutual support and information exchange seem very successful.

The second approach involves short-term contracts. The two countries which have done most along these lines are France and Spain, with substantial lowering of LTU as a result. These allow people to take jobs with a limited tenure, so that it will not cost a small fortune to get rid of them if they are unsatisfactory. This greatly lessens the risk to employers, and makes them much more willing to offer temporary jobs to the long-term unemployed.

All this suggests that the increasing preference of unions in Australia for adding redundancy pay provisions to awards, and the attempt to prevent employers avoiding award provisions either by employing non-union workers (who are in any case covered, willy-nilly, by award provisions), as well as to bring casual and part-time workers under awards, is contributing greatly to the size and persistence of the long-term unemployment problem in Australia.

Mike Keating’s committee will, of course, be familiar with the OECD analysis, and will largely agree with it. It will say what the OECD has said, and what I have said, though not so clearly and bluntly.

In the meantime, the ACTU and the Federal Government will continue merrily along, playing charades with the Industrial Relations Commission at the expense of the sufferers. If you want to know who is keeping so many people on the dole and in long-term misery, they are the culprits.

***
2.
Padraic P. McGuinness, “White Paper destined to disappoint on jobs,” The Weekend Australian, April 30-May 1, 1994, p. 2.

Next Wednesday, the Federal Government intends to release its White Paper on employment, industry and regional policy. The ballyhoo surrounding this is already comparing it in significance to the White Paper on full employment published by the Chifley government in 1945.

It will not, however, by anything like as important. What it will demonstrate is the bankruptcy of ideas as to solutions to the problems it addresses.

The 1945 White Paper was very significant in its time. It represented the capitulation of the Australian government to Keynesian ideas, as reported back by economists like Nugget Coombs, later the governor of the central bank for some 20 years.

It, of course, came at the end of World War II, a time at which the great corporatist-State war, between Germany and Japan on the one hand, and the Soviet Union on the other, had been won by the democratic Allies who spoiled Hitler’s plans and then endorsed Left-fascism as an ally. Left-fascism triumphed against Right-fascism only because of the strength of capitalist America.

But the war was seen as the product of the mass unemployment of the 1930s, and the conversion of the intellectuals to Keynesianism was, in part, the adoption of what seemed to be a nostrum against unemployment.

It was closely related to the rise of the bureaucracy, which was the main beneficiary of Keynesianism, and the belief that governments could fine-tune the economy, a mixed public and private sector economy, with an admixture of the central planning notions derived from the Soviet Union.

(In those days the intellectuals were seduced by the lies about communism disseminated by Sidney and Beatrice Webb in their deluded treatise, Soviet Communism — a New Civilisation.)

So what the 1945 White Paper was announcing was a new ideology for the rising white-collar class, a justification for an expansion of the public sector and the belief that bureaucrats knew better than the citizenry how to govern the economy.

Nearly 50 years later things are very different. The Soviet Union has collapsed, and its separated republics are suffering from mass unemployment, hyper-inflation and rampant crime. The idea of government fine-tuning of capitalist economies is discredited. The bureaucrats are no longer seen as possessed of special wisdom. To the extent that Keynesianism is still discussed, it is as the orthodoxy of second-rate academic economists.

Keynes himself, of course, never subscribed to more than a fraction of the crimes that have been committed in his name.

The whole intellectual edifice of the Left is in ruins. There is nothing much to replace it as the ideology of the chattering classes, except a ragbag of notions left over from the 60s and 70s which have everywhere been shown to have contributed to the breakdown of the family, the creation of mass homelessness, unemployment and poverty.

The nostrums of the conservatives and the market-oriented liberals have not fared much better, since the latter always oversold their prescriptions on the assumption that transition to deregulation and the breaking down of the corporatist institutions would be easy and painless; while the former can only appeal to a vanished past which cannot be recreated.

So what can the White Paper produce which will be comparable to the pathbreaking White Paper of 1945?

Nothing at all. The Green Paper on restoring employment opportunities published last December demonstrated the barrenness of thinking in official circles.

Although the committee included some of the best public service and academic labour economists in the country, it was unable to break free of the straitjacket of Labor orthodoxy.

It had neither the ability nor the courage to tell the truth about the causes and cures of unemployment.

Even though its chairman, Mike Keating, head of the Department of the Prime Minister, knows perfectly well what the economic issues are (and stated them clearly enough when he said last year that the rate of unemployment is a matter of choice), his committee could not bring itself to admit whose choices determine the rate of unemployment.

The “jobs compact” it proposed is a poor joke. The idea of subsidising the cost of labour to employers in order to offset the huge contribution to unemployment of award wages was dodged, because it was being perverted into a proposal to tax business still more — hardly a sensible way of encouraging employment.

The simple truth is that the only way to get most of the present unemployed back to work is reduce the cost of employing them to employers — and if we cannot or do not wish, for social reasons, to cut wages directly, then they will have to be cut by taxing those in employment.

The White Paper will dodge the idea of a wage-subsidy paid for by a tax levy on those in employment, since the Government knows that the union version of it would be a disaster, and any effective version will be resisted by the unions.

That is, the present high unemployment is, in Mike Keating’s terms (he did not say it), the choice of the middle class. They would rather have people on the dole than concede “hard-won conditions”.

Industry and regional policy equally have little to contribute. The only sensible industry policy in terms of employment is to reduce the cost of labour, directly or indirectly, and reduce the costs imposed on business by regulation and taxation — especially the hugely disproportionate burden placed on small business. Instead, the new Industrial Relations Act has increased the burdens.

Regional policy is meaningless unless the regions are economically viable. Since it has been union and government policy for years to abolish regional differentials in award wages, regions like South Australia and many others have lost their economic advantage.

Again, the only sensible regional policy is to make them more productive, or restore their former cost advantages. (To have identical award wages between Sydney and rural regions or minor cities is to ignore the fact that the cost of living, especially housing, is much lower out of Sydney.)

Industry policy which tries to identify “national champions” or particular industries will simply lead to massive bureaucratic bungling. Industry policy which removes the burdens on exporters, regulatory and tax, and which assists in the ease of availability to competitive finance, can be beneficial.

But anything which the White Paper adds which goes beyond the issues of taxation, regulation and the cost of finance will be harmful, not beneficial.

The danger is that the 1994 White Paper will offer the soured and distorted echoes of the failures of the high hopes which filled the hearts of the ambitious young bureaucrats and socialists who came out of the Depression and the War and wrote the 1945 White Paper.

Communism has failed. Socialism has failed. Planning has failed. Keynesianism has failed. Marxism has failed. Soo too, monetarism has failed. Extreme economic liberalism has failed.

The worship of markets has failed. There are no great ideologies, no nostrums, no ideal systems. Governments and bureaucrats do not know what they are doing; regulation for the sake of regulation is as good a path to disaster as government collapse. Instead, we ought to try a bit of pragmatism.